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T he topic of the following pages is the rights of non-citizens from the stan-dpoint of human rights and constitutional law. It is a fascinating subject which is very much in a stage of rapid and radical transition, doubtless 
affected by the process of globalization of people, enterprises and law, therefore 
I will start with a couple of reflexions about public and private International Law.
Public international law was formerly largely concerned with positivist 
questions relating to such matters as sovereignty, state succession and inter-
national treaties1. Over the past few decades it has increasingly absorbed a 
rich normative repertoire, notably in respect of human rights, with the great 
1 Public international law was also saturated with racist and imperialist assumptions which facili-
tated the seizure of the land and assets of colonized countries: see GOZZI, G., History of Interna-
tional Law and Western Civilization (2007).
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international human rights instruments of the United Nations, and the devel-
opment of international criminal justice.
Many modern constitutions incorporate within their framework princi-
ples of international law and international human rights.
A similar process is apparent in relation to private international law. The 
traditional approach was to downplay human rights concerns. The public pol-
icy (order public) principle enabled courts to distance themselves from par-
ticularly egregious human rights violations but the private international law 
themes of jurisdiction, choice of law and recognition of foreign judgments 
did not contain any developed sense of respect to international human rights 
norms. Recently, important changes have occurred. Foreign state immunity is 
contracting when confronted by claims for serious violations of human rights2.
The U.S. Alien Torts Claims Act of 1789 has yielded a rich jurisprudence on 
compensation for egregious human rights violations throughout the world 
and offers a useful model for other countries to follow. International conven-
tions on private international law, such as the Hague Convention on Interna-
tional Child Abduction of 1980, display sensitivity to human rights concerns. 
Moreover, the gradual increase in emphasis on habitual residence rather than 
nationality or domicile as a connecting factor in private international law has, 
in its result if not its intent, improved the position of non-citizens.
Let us turn to the subject of international human rights. Over the past 
six decades we have witnessed the phenomenon of human rights becoming 
an integral element in the global political order. Beginning with the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, international human rights instru-
ments, at global and regional levels, shape the contours of international law 
and, increasingly, as I have mentioned, national constitutions. The process is 
far from complete: it has a dynamic character which promises further radical 
change in coming years.
Two central aspects of human rights theory are the concept of human 
dignity and the universality of human rights. Both of these concepts challenge 
notions of legal positivism and require a revision of traditional thinking in re-
lation to state sovereignty, territoriality and lack of concern for non-citizens. 
Human rights theory does not tear down national boundaries or require a 
form of world government that extinguishes the sovereignty of states; it does, 
2 See FOCARELLI, «Denying Foreign State Immunity for Commission of International Crimes: 
The Ferrini Decision», 54 Int. & Comp. L. Q. 951 (2005).
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however, force us to reassess old attitudes and to reconsider the question of 
the rights of non-citizens.
Human dignity involves the notion of the inherent value and equal worth 
of every human being. This is a radical and transformative concept, which 
forces us to recognise in the stranger a creature of inestimable value. It breaks 
down the sense of «them and us» which can attach to notions of citizenship 
and alienage.
Let us look a little more closely at international human rights require-
ments in relation to non-citizens. The first, and most important, of these re-
quirements is that of equal treatment.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) defines the funda-
mental rights of all people. Article 14 (1) states that «everyone has the right 
to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution». Article 15 
stipulates that «everyone has the right to a nationality» and that «no one shall 
be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his 
nationality».
Under Article 2 (1) of the International Covenant of Civil and Political 
Rights (1976) every state party undertakes to grant «all individuals within its 
territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present 
Covenant without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth 
or other status». These rights include the right to fair procedure, freedom of 
expression, and protection from tyranny and injustice. This Covenant also 
prohibits the expulsion of lawful aliens from a nation without fair procedures, 
except when national security does not permit. The alien must also be provid-
ed with representation.
In its General Comment No. 15. The Position of Aliens under the Covenant,
the Human Rights Committee explains that: «the general rule is that each 
one of the rights of the Covenant must be guaranteed without discrimination 
between citizens and aliens. Aliens receive the benefit of the general require-
ment of non-discrimination in respect of the rights guaranteed in the Cove-
nant, as provided for in article 2 thereof. This guarantee applies to aliens and 
citizens alike. Exceptionally, some of the rights recognized in the Covenant 
are expressly applicable only to citizens (art. 25), while article 13 applies only 
to aliens. However, the Committee’s experience in examining reports shows 
that in a number of countries other rights that aliens should enjoy under the 
Covenant are denied to them or are subject to limitations that cannot always 
be justified under the Covenant...
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The Covenant does not recognize the right of aliens to enter or reside in 
the territory of a State party. It is in principle a matter for the State to decide 
who it will admit to its territory. However, in certain circumstances an alien 
may enjoy the protection of the Covenant even in relation to entry or resi-
dence, for example, when considerations of non-discrimination, prohibition 
of inhuman treatment and respect for family life arise.
Consent for entry may be given subject to conditions relating, for ex-
ample, to movement, residence and employment. A State may also impose 
general conditions upon an alien who is in transit. However, once aliens are 
allowed to enter the territory of a State party they are entitled to the rights set 
out in the Covenant.
«Aliens thus have an inherent right to life, protected by law, and may 
not be arbitrarily deprived of life. They must not be subjected to torture or 
to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; nor may they be 
held in slavery or servitude. Aliens have the full right to liberty and security 
of the person. If lawfully deprived of their liberty, they shall be treated with 
humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of their person. Aliens 
may not be imprisoned for failure to fulfil a contractual obligation. They 
have the right to liberty of movement and free choice of residence; they 
shall be free to leave the country. Aliens shall be equal before the courts and 
tribunals, and shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, 
independent and impartial tribunal established by law in the determination 
of any criminal charge or of rights and obligations in a suit at law. Aliens 
shall not be subjected to retrospective penal legislation, and are entitled 
to recognition before the law. They may not be subjected to arbitrary or 
unlawful interference with their privacy, family, home or correspondence. 
They have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, and the 
right to hold opinions and to express them. Aliens receive the benefit of the 
right of peaceful assembly and of freedom of association. They may marry 
when at marriageable age. Their children are entitled to those measures of 
protection required by their status as minors. In those cases where aliens 
constitute a minority within the meaning of article 27, they shall not be 
denied the right, in community with other members of their group, to enjoy 
their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion and to use their 
own language. Aliens are entitled to equal protection by the law. There shall 
be no discrimination between aliens and citizens in the application of these 
rights. These rights of aliens may be qualified only by such limitations as 
may be lawfully imposed under the Covenant.
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Once an alien is lawfully within a territory, his freedom of movement 
within the territory and his right to leave that territory may only be restric-
ted in accordance with article 12, paragraph 3. Differences in treatment in 
this regard between aliens and nationals, or between different categories of 
aliens, need to be justified under article 12, paragraph 3. Since such restric-
tions must, inter alia, be consistent with the other rights recognized in the 
Covenant, a State party cannot, by restraining an alien or deporting him to 
a third country, arbitrarily prevent his return to his own country (art. 12, 
para. 4)»3.
The UN General Assembly’s Declaration on the Human Rights of Individ-
uals Who Are Not Nationals of the Country in Which They Live4 is also worth 
nothing. The Declaration contains provisions that are designed to assuage 
concerns that it offers improper assistance to law breakers. Article 2 (1) pro-
vides that:
«Nothing in this Declaration shall be interpreted as legitimizing the ille-
gal entry into and presence in a State of any alien, nor shall any provision 
be interpreted as restricting the right of any State to promulgate Laws and 
regulations concerning the entry of aliens and the terms and conditions of 
their stay or to establish differences between nationals and aliens. However, 
such laws and regulations shall not be incompatible with the international 
legal obligations of that State, including those in the field of human rights».
Moreover, Article 4 requires that:
«Aliens shall observe the laws of the State in which they reside or are 
present and regard with respect the customs and traditions of the people of 
that State».
Article 5 provides as follows:
«1. Aliens shall enjoy, in accordance with domestic law and subject to the 
relevant international obligation of the State in which they are present, in 
particular the following rights:
(a) The right to life and security of person; no alien shall be subjected to 
arbitrary arrest or detention; no alien shall be deprived of his or her liberty 
except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedures as are es-
tablished by law;
3 Paras 2, 5-8
4 A/RES/40/144 (13 December 1985).
Libro Persona Derecho 70-71.indb   279 19/11/15   16:53
WILLIAM BINCHY
280 PERSONA Y DERECHO / VOL. 71 / 2014/2
(b) The right to protection against arbitrary or unlawful interference with 
privacy, family, home or correspondence;
(c) The right to be equal before the courts, tribunals and all other organs 
and authorities administering justice and, when necessary, to free assistance 
of an interpreter in criminal proceedings and, when prescribed by law, other 
proceedings;
(d) The right to retain their own language, culture and tradition;
(e) The right to freedom of thought, opinion, conscience and religion; 
the right to manifest their religion or beliefs, subject only to such limitations 
as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, 
health or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others;
(f) The right to retain their own language, culture and tradition;
(g) The right to transfer abroad earnings, savings or other personal mo-
netary assets, subject to domestic currency regulations.
2. Subject to such restrictions as are prescribed by law and which are 
necessary in a democratic society to protect national security, public safety, 
public order, public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others, 
and which are consistent with the other rights recognized in the relevant 
international instruments and those set forth in this Declaration, aliens shall 
enjoy the following rights:
(a) The right to leave the country;
(b) The right to freedom of expression;
(c) The right to peaceful assembly;
(d) The right to own property alone as well as in association with others, 
subject to domestic law.
3. Subject to the provisions referred to in paragraph 2, aliens lawfully in 
the territory of a State shall enjoy the right to liberty of movement and free-
dom to choose their residence within the borders of the State.
4. Subject to national legislation and due authorization, the spouse and 
minor or dependent children of an alien lawfully residing in the territory of 
a State shall be admitted to accompany, join and stay with the alien».
Article 6 provides that no alien is to be subjected to torture or to cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and that; in particular, no 
alien shall be subjected without his or her free consent to medical or scientific 
experimentation.
Article 7 provides that an alien lawfully in the territory of a State may 
be expelled from it only in pursuance of a decision reached in accordance 
with law and, except where compelling reasons of national security otherwise 
require, should be allowed to submit the reasons why he or she should not 
Libro Persona Derecho 70-71.indb   280 19/11/15   16:53
HUMAN RIGHTS, CONSTITUTIONS AND NON-CITIZENS
PERSONA Y DERECHO / VOL. 71 / 2014/2 281
be expelled. It goes on to prohibit individual or collective expulsion of such 
aliens on grounds of race, color, religion, culture, descent or national or ethnic 
origin.
Article 8 provides as follows:
«1. Aliens lawfully residing in the territory of a State shall also enjoy, 
in accordance with the national laws, the following rights, subject to their 
obligations under article 4:
(a) The right to safe and healthy working conditions, to fair wages and 
equal remuneration for work of equal value without distinction of any kind, 
in particular, women being guaranteed conditions of work not inferior to 
those enjoyed by men, with equal pay for equal work;
(b) The right to join trade unions and other organizations or associations 
of their choice and to participate in their activities. No restrictions may be 
placed on the exercise of this right other than those prescribed by law and 
which are necessary, in a democratic society, in the interests of national se-
curity or public order or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others;
(c) The right to health protection, medical care, social security, social ser-
vices, education, rest and leisure, provided that they fulfil the requirements 
under the relevant regulations for participation and that undue strain is not 
placed on the resources of the State.
2. With a view to protecting the rights of aliens carrying on lawful paid 
activities in the country in which they are present, such rights may be spe-
cified by the Governments concerned in multilateral or bilateral conven-
tions».
Under Article 9, an alien is to be arbitrarily deprived of his or her law-
fully acquired assets.
Under Article 10, any alien is to be free at any time to communicate 
with the consulate or diplomatic mission of the State of which he or she is a 
national.
The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination of 1969 is also relevant. Article 1 (3) provides that nothing in 
the Convention may be interpreted as affecting in any way the legal provi-
sions of States Parties concerning nationality, citizenship or naturalization, 
provided that such provisions do not discriminate against any particular na-
tionality. This proviso is important: statutory provisions that appear to be 
based on citizenship status may sometimes disguise a discrimination based 
on nationality.
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If we look at what is happening in international human rights today, we 
see an expansion of obligations beyond States Parties to non State actors, com-
mercial or personal. We also see a very slow movement towards a theory of 
human responsibilities as well as rights. 60th of these developments are likely 
to have an effect on rights and responsibilities of non-citizens in coming years.
NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS
Let us now turn to consider the position of non-citizens under national 
constitutions. Some constitutions expressly limit their protection to citizens. 
Others, including Spain’s, contain generous provisions in relation to the rights 
of non-citizens. Still others are unclear on the position of non-citizens. I will 
refer briefly to some of these approaches.
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
The Constitution of the United States of America does not contain clear 
provisions relating to non-citizens. It has been necessary for the Supreme 
Court to provide authoritative interpretation.
Very briefly, the position is that non-citizens present in the United States 
may be able to invoke particular provisions of the Constitution but whether 
they can claim the same protection as citizens depends very much on the par-
ticular right in question and the context in which it has allegedly been violated.
In Plyler v Doe5, the United States Supreme Court, by a 5 to 4 majority 
held that children who had not been «legally admitted» to the United States 
were nonetheless entitled to claim the benefit of the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth amendment when successfully challenging a Texas statute 
withholding from local school districts funds for their education. The Court 
considered it clear from the record of the Congressional Debates of 1866 that 
it had been like intent of the framers of the Amendment to extend its protec-
tion to all those present which the jurisdiction of any of the States.
Brennan J observed:
«That a person’s initial entry into a State, or into the United States, was 
unlawful, and that he may for that reason be expelled, cannot negate the 
simple fact of his presence within the State’s territorial perimeter. Given 
such presence, he is subject to the full range of obligations imposed by the 
5 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
Libro Persona Derecho 70-71.indb   282 19/11/15   16:53
HUMAN RIGHTS, CONSTITUTIONS AND NON-CITIZENS
PERSONA Y DERECHO / VOL. 71 / 2014/2 283
State’s civil and criminal laws. And until he leaves the jurisdiction –either 
voluntarily, or involuntarily in accordance with the Constitution and laws 
of the United States– he is entitled to the equal protection of the laws that a 
State may choose to establish».
The Court acknowledged that the appropriate test to apply to the legisla-
tion was its «rational relationship» to a legitimate public purpose. The Court 
considered that the legislation failed this test:
«Sheer incapability or lax enforcement of the laws barring entry into this 
country, coupled with the failure to establish an effective bar to the emplo-
yment of undocumented aliens, has resulted in the creation of a substantial 
«shadow population» of illegal migrants –numbering in the millions– within 
our borders. This situation raises the specter of a permanent [457 U.S. 202, 
219] caste of undocumented resident aliens, encouraged by some to remain 
here as a source of cheap labor, but nevertheless denied the benefits that 
our society makes available to citizens and lawful residents. The existence of 
such an underclass presents most difficult problems for a Nation that prides 
itself on adherence to principles of equality under law.
The children who are plaintiffs in these cases are special members of this 
underclass. Persuasive arguments support the view that a State may withhold 
its beneficence from those whose very presence within the United States is the 
product of their own unlawful conduct. These arguments do not apply with 
the same force to classifications imposing disabilities on the minor children 
of such illegal entrants. At the least, those who elect to enter our territory by 
stealth and in violation of our law should be prepared to bear the consequenc-
es, including, but not limited to, deportation. But, the children of those illegal 
entrants are not comparably situated. Their «parents have the ability to con-
form their conduct to societal norms», and presumably the ability to remove 
themselves from the State’s jurisdiction; but the children who are plaintiffs in 
these cases «can affect neither their parents’ conduct nor their own status». 
Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 770 (1977). Even if the State found it expe-
dient to control the conduct of adults by acting against their children, legisla-
tion directing the onus of a parent’s misconduct against his children does not 
comport with fundamental conceptions of justice.
«[V]isiting... condemnation on the head of an infant is illogical and un-
just. Moreover, imposing disabilities on the child is contrary to the basic 
concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to 
individual responsibility or wrongdoing. Obviously, no child is responsible 
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for his birth and penalizing the... child is an ineffectuall –as well as unjust– 
way of deterring the parent». Weber V. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406
U.S. 164, 175 (1972).
Of course, undocumented status is not irrelevant to any proper legislative 
goal. Nor is undocumented status an absolutely immutable characteristic 
since it is the product of conscious, indeed unlawful, action. But the legisla-
tion is directed against children, and imposes its discriminatory burden on 
the basis of a legal characteristic over which children can have little control. 
It is thus difficult to conceive of a rational justification for penalizing these 
children for their presence within the United States. Yet that appears to be 
precisely the effect of [the legislation]».
Brennan J went on to observe:
«Undocumented aliens cannot be treated as a suspect class because their 
presence in this country in violation of federal law is not a «constitutional 
irrelevancy.» Nor is education a fundamental right; a State need not justify 
by compelling necessity every variation in the manner in which education 
is provided to its population. See San Antonio Independent School Dist. 
v. Rodriguez, supra, at 28-39. But more is involved in these cases than the 
abstract question whether 21.031 discriminates against a suspect class, or 
whether education is a fundamental right. Section 21.031 imposes a lifetime 
hardship on a discrete class of children not accountable for their disabling 
status. The stigma of illiteracy will mark them for the rest of their lives. By 
denying these children a basic education, we deny them the ability to live 
within the structure of our civic institutions, and foreclose any realistic pos-
sibility that they will contribute in even the smallest way to the progress of 
our Nation. In determining the rationality of 21.031, we may appropriately 
take into account its costs to the Nation and to the innocent children who 
are its victims. In light of these countervailing costs, the discrimination con-
tained in 21.031 can hardly be considered rational unless it furthers some 
substantial goal of the State».
The Court could identify no such goal
What about the position where an alleged violation of the Constitution 
occurs outside the territory of the United States, to a non-citizen? In Boumedi-
ene v Bush6, the United States Supreme Court last June has given the answer, at 
6 U.S. Supreme Ct, 12 June 2008.
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all events in the context of habeas corpus. The majority of the Court, against a 
strong dissent from Scalia J, held that no «formalistic sovereignty-based test» 
applied but rather that the answer would be found by assessing in the particu-
lar circumstances whether judicial enforcement would be «impracticable and 
anomalous».
SOUTH AFRICA
As you know the post-apartheid Constitution of South Africa is a very 
liberal document placing emphasis on dignity and equality.
In Khosa v Minister of Social Development7, the Constitutional Court of 
South Africa held that permanent residents who were not citizens had a con-
stitutional right or social security and that legislation which deprived them of 
this right violated their dignity and equality.
The Minister had argued that citizenship was a requirement for social 
benefits in almost all developed countries8. Mokgoro J responded: «That may 
be so in respect of certain benefits. But unlike ours, those countries do not 
have constitutions that entitle ‘everyone’ to have access to social security, nor 
are their immigration and welfare laws necessarily the same as ours9.
«It may be reasonable to exclude from the legislative scheme workers who 
are citizens of other countries, visitors and illegal residents, who have only a 
tenuous link with this country. The position of permanent residents is, howe-
ver, quite different to that of temporary or illegal residents. They reside le-
gally in the country and may have done so for a considerable length of time. 
Like citizens, they have made South Africa their home. While citizens may 
leave the country indefinitely without forfeiting their citizenship, permanent 
residents are compelled to return to the country (except in certain circumstan-
ces) at least once every three years. While they do not have the rights tied to 
citizenship, such as political rights and the right to a South African passport, 
they are, for all other purposes mentioned above, in much the same position 
as citizens. Once admitted as permanent residents they can enter and leave 
7 2004 (6) BCLR 569 (CC), analyzed by Williams, «Issues and Challenges in Addressing Pov-
erty and Legal Rights: A Comparative United States / South African Analysis», 21 S. Af. J. on 
Human Rts 450 (2005), OLIVIER, M. and VONK, G. (eds.), Comparative Review of the Position of 
Non-citizen Migrants in Social Security (Report for the South African Treasury, 2004).
8 The Minister referred to the position in the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom.
9 Para. 54.
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the country. Their homes and no doubt in most cases their families too, are 
in South Africa. Some will have children born in South Africa. They have the 
right to work in South Africa, and even owe a duty of allegiance to the state. 
For these reasons, I exclude temporary residents...»10.
The Minister sought to rely on the decision of a United States appellate 
court in City of Chicago v Shalala11, holding that the exclusion of non-citizen 
permanent residents from participation in a legislative welfare scheme was 
not inconsistent with the equal protection clause of the US Constitution. The 
American Court had applied a rational basis standard of review, holding that 
there was a rational connection between the federal government’s immigra-
tion policy and its welfare policy of encouraging the self-sufficiency of im-
migrants. Under section 27 (2) of the South African Constitution, however, 
a higher standard, of reasonableness, was applied. This set the bar far higher 
than the rational basis test.
The Court went on to hold that the exclusion of permanent residents 
from benefits constituted discrimination. Mokgoro J observed:
«There can be no doubt that the applicants are part of a vulnerable group 
in society and, in the circumstances of the present case, are worthy of consti-
tutional protection. We are dealing, here, with intentional, statutorily sanc-
tioned unequal treatment of part of the South African community. This has 
a strong stigmatising effect. Because both permanent residents and citizens 
contribute to the welfare system through the payment of taxes, the lack of 
congruence between benefits and burdens created by a law that denies be-
nefits to permanent residents almost inevitably creates the impression that 
permanent residents are in some way inferior to citizens and less worthy of 
social assistance»12.
The denial of the welfare benefits impacted not only on permanent res-
idents without other means of support, but also on the families, friends and 
communities with whom they had contact. Apart from the undue burden that 
this placed on those who took on this responsibility, it was «likely to have a 
serious impact on the dignity of the permanent residents concerned who are 
cast in the role of supplicants»13.
10 Para. 59.
11 189 F.3d 598 (7th Cir 1999).
12 Para. 74.
13 Para. 76.
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Mokgoro J concluded her analysis as follows:
«The Constitution vests the right to social security in ‘everyone’. By ex-
cluding permanent residents from the scheme for social security, the legisla-
tion limits their rights in a manner that affects their dignity and equality in 
material respects. Dignity and equality are founding values of the Constitu-
tion and lie at the heart of the Bill of Rights. Sufficient reason for such inva-
sive treatment of the rights of permanent residents has not been established. 
The exclusion of permanent residents is therefore inconsistent with section 
27 of the Constitution»14.
The Khosa decision is of interest to comparative lawyers in its invocation 
of universalist norms of dignity and equality, albeit based on an analysis of the 
specific provisions of the South African Constitution. The willingness of the 
Constitutional Court, however, to restrict the constitutional entitlement to 
permanent residents is hard to reconcile with these norms, since the needs of 
temporary residents may in some cases be very pressing. The decision may be 
contrasted with the Court’s high sensitivity to the needs of the destitute in the 
famous Grootboom15 decision.
CANADÁ
There has been some interesting jurisprudence on the rights of non-cit-
izens. The Supreme Court of Canada regards discrimination based on citi-
zenship as an analogous ground of discrimination under section 15 (1) of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
This does not inevitably mean that there is a violation of the Charter16.
In Lavoie v The Queen in Right of Canada17, the exclusion of non-citizen perma-
nent residents from access to public service employment was held defensible 
as it was considered to act as a legitimate incentive to permanent residents to 
become citizens of Canada, which relies so much on its policy of encouraging 
immigration. In Charkaoui v Canada18, the Supreme Court of Canada reject-
ed a claim that section 15 had been violated where permanent residents and 
foreign nationals deemed a threat to national security were detained; section 
14 Para. 85.
15 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC).
16 [1999] 1 SCR 497.
17 2002 SCC 23.
18 2007 SCC 9.
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6 of the Charter specifically permitted differential treatment of citizens and 
non-citizens in deportation matters. In other respects, however, the deten-
tions were held to violate the Charter.
IRELAND
Let me turn to consider the position in Ireland. It is, of course, the coun-
try with whose legal system I am most familiar; but it also has a rich jurispru-
dence on the subject which may be of interest to comparative lawyers.
The task on identifying who are rights-holders under the Constitution 
has been complicated by two decisions over three decades ago: Byrne v Ire-
land19 and Mestell v Coras Iompair Eireann20 While taking strong and welcome 
position on two specific issues –state immunity and horizontality of enforce-
ment of rights– they failed to provide any considered analysis of the scope of 
a right under the Constitution, the criteria for being a rights-holder or the 
question whether the scope of a right against the State is necessarily co-exten-
sive with that of a right against a non-State actor.
In Byrne, the Supreme Court, by a majority, held that the State was not 
immune from being sued in tort. Much of Walsh J’s analysis related to the 
question whether the British royal prerogative of sovereign immunity (that 
«the King can do no wrong») had survived the coming into force of the 1922 
Constitution. That issue is not our present concern. What is of more relevance 
is Walsh J’s concept of «the state» and its relationship with «the people». 
In the High Court, Murnaghan J had grounded the State’s immunity from 
suit on Article 5 of the Constitution, wherein it is asserted that «Ireland is a 
sovereign... state». Murnaghan J considered that «th[is] simple statement... is 
completely inconsistent with the propositions that the State is subject to one 
of the organs of the State, the judicial organ, and can be sued as such in its own 
courts». Walsh J could not accept that interpretation:
«It seems to one to assume that, even if the State is the sovereign authori-
ty and not simply the creation of the acknowledged sovereign authority, the 
people, the concept of being sued in court is necessarily inconsistent with 
the theory of sovereignty».
19 [1972] IR 241. Far analysis see KELLY, J., The Irish Constitution (4th. ed. By G. Hogan & G. 
Whyte, 2003), Hogan, G. & Morgan, D. G., A Constitutional Law in Ireland (3rd ed., 1998), 
Chapter 17.
20 [1973] IR 121.
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Walsh J went on to note that:
«[i]n several parts of the Constitution duties to make certain provisions 
for the benefit of the citizens are imposed on the State in terms which bes-
tow rights upon the citizens and, unless some contrary provision appears 
in the Constitution, the Constitution must be deemed to have created a 
remedy for the enforcement of these rights. It follows that, where the right 
is one guaranteed by the State, it is against the State that the remedy must 
be sought if there has been a failure to discharge the constitutional obliga-
tion. The Oireachtas cannot prevent or restrict the citizen from pursuing his 
remedy against the state in order to obtain or defend the very rights guaran-
teed by the Constitution in the form of obligation imposed upon the State; 
nor can the Oireachtas delegate to any organ of state the implementation of 
these rights so as to exonerate the state itself from its obligation under the 
Constitution»21.
Later in his judgment, Walsh J said:
«Where the people by the Constitution create rights against the State or 
impose duties upon the State, a remedy must be deemed to be available. It 
is as much the duty of the State to render justice against itself in favour of 
citizens as it is to administer the same between private individuals».
What emerges from Walsh J’s analysis is a perception of the State, not 
at the apex of constitutional authority, but rather as the agent of the people, 
obliged to discharge its responsibilities to citizens no less than one citizen is 
obligated to discharge his or her responsibilities to other citizens22. This does 
not, of course, mean that the actual or content of the State’s responsibilities to 
citizens is identical to that of the responsibilities owed by one citizen to an-
other.
It is interesting to note that Walsh J interprets the State’s various guaran-
tees to citizens in the Constitution as representing the imposition by the Con-
21 The reference to the facts that Constitution bestows «rights upon the citizens» and that the 
Oireachtas cannot «prevent or restrict the citizen from pursuing his remedy against the state 
in order to obtain or defend the rights guaranteed by the Constitution...» do not appear to be 
premised on any developed theory of a nexus between citizenship and the state but rather on the 
simple fact that «[I]n several parts of the Constitution duties to make certain provisions for the 
benefit of the citizens are imposed on the State...».
22 I will use the words «citizens» here merely to echo Walsh J’s language rather than to prejudge 
the question of who is a rights-holder.
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stitution on the State of the duty to «make certain provision, for the benefit of 
the citizens». This does not amount to a theory of citizenship guaranteeing a 
relationship of rights and duties between the citizen and the State but rather 
a constitutional theory in which «the people» are sovereign and in which the 
rights and duties as between citizens and State are those which happen to have 
been prescribed by the people in their constitutional document.
In Meskell v Caras lompair Eireann23, Walsh J stated that a right guaran-
teed or granted by the Constitution «can be protected... or enforced by action 
even though such action may not fit into any of the ordinary forms of action 
in either common law or equity and... the constitutional right carries within 
it its own right to a remedy or for the enforcement of it. Therefore, if a per-
son has suffered damage by virtue of a breach of a constitutional right or the 
infringement of a constitutional right, that person is entitled to seek redress 
against the... persons who have infringed that right».
The effect of this holding is significant. If constitutional rights are rights 
enforceable simply against the State then it is relatively easy to handle the 
question of the international remit of constitutional protection. In such a ju-
ridical order, a person cannot complain that his or her constitutional rights 
have been infringed by some non-state actor or by a foreign state. If, however, 
as is the case in Irish constitutional theory, constitutional rights are enforce-
able, not merely against the State but against non-state actors, it no longer is 
conceptually impossible to envisage the infringement of these rights by such 
non-state actors, whether within the state or abroad, or by a foreign state. 
Good reasons, of principle or practical policy, may be found for limiting or ex-
cluding the remedy for infringements of this character where they lack a nexus
–personal, political or territorial– sufficient to warrant granting such a 
remedy, but courts cannot simply have resort to the sheer axiomatic impossi-
bility of recognizing the entitlement to a remedy in such circumstances.
It seems that a combination of factors –territoriality, including place of 
acting and place of infringement of the right, the degree of connectedness of 
the transgressor with Ireland– is involved. This seems to be different in the 
case of the relationship between the victim and the Irish State. Here, courts 
may be less concerned with the particular intensity of connectedness between 
the victim and the State. It is hard to articulate the grounds for making such 
a distinction but one can be reasonably confident that courts, in spite of the 
23 [1973] IR, at 132-33.
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easy equiperation in Meskell between the position of the state and non-state 
actors, will be more circumspect about imposing liability on the latter where 
there is some degree of disconnectedness between the victim or transgressor 
within Ireland.
Articles 40 to 44 of the Constitution: Preliminary Observations
Articles 40 to 44 of the Constitution are the fundamental rights provi-
sions. Of course other provisions in the Constitution protect rights that are 
surely also fundamental such as the right to vote or the right to be tried on a 
criminal charge in due course of law. The extent of the entitlement of non-cit-
izens to vote is clear and unambiguous and therefore need not detain us. Later 
I shall refer to the jurisprudence on trial in due course of law. Anticipating 
that discussion, I can mention here that non-citizenship does not appear to be 
problematic in that context.
Our present concern relates to the selective limitation of certain rights 
to citizens. The crucial provision relating to equality –Article 40.1– provides 
that:
«[a]II citizens shall, as human persons, be held equal before the law...».
Under Article 40.3.1 the State guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as 
far as practicable by its laws to defend and vindicate the personal rights of the 
citizen. And Article 40.3.2 provides that the State:
«shall in particular, by its laws protect as best it may from unjust attack 
and, in the case of injustice done, vindicate the life, person, good name and 
property rights of every citizen».
The persistent emphasis on the citizen in these provisions is striking.
Article 40.4 contains a dissonance between subsection 1 and subsection 
2, in that the former prohibits the deprivation of personal liberty of citizens, 
save in accordance with the law, whereas the latter permits a challenge to the 
deprivation of liberty to be made «on behalf of any person». The jurispru-
dence takes the broad view and does not exclude non-citizens from invoking 
Article 40.4.2º.
Article 40.5 provides for the inviolability of the dwelling of every citizen 
and Article 40.6 prescribes the right of citizens to express freely their con-
victions and opinions, to assemble peacefully and to form associations and 
unions. Note again the persistent references to citizens in these provisions.
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Let us now turn to Articles 41 and 42, which do not include any reference 
to citizens.
Article 41 provides:
«1. 1º The State recognizes the Family as the natural primary and fun-
damental unit group of Society, and as a moral institution possessing ina-
lienable and imprescriptible rights, antecedent and superior to all positive 
law.
2º The State, therefore, guarantees to protect the Family in its constitu-
tion and authority, as the necessary basis of social order and as indispensable 
to the welfare of the Nation and the State.
2.1º In particular, the State recognizes that by her life within the home, 
woman gives to the State a support without which the common good cannot 
be achieved.
2º The State shall, therefore, endeavour to ensure that mothers shall not 
be obliged by economic necessity to engage in labour to the neglect of their 
duties in the home.
3. 1º The State pledges itself to guard with special care the institution of 
Marriage, on which the Family is founded, and to protect it against attack.
2º A Court designated by law may grant a dissolution of marriage where, 
but only where, it is satisfied that
i. at the date of the institution of the proceedings, the spouses have lived 
apart from one another for a period of, or periods amounting to, at least four 
years during the five years,
ii. there is no reasonable prospect of a reconciliation between the spouses,
iii. such provision as the Court considers proper having regard to the 
circumstances exists or will be made for the spouses, any children of either 
or both of them and any other person prescribed by law, and
iv. any further conditions prescribed by law are complied with.
3º No person whose marriage has been dissolved under the civil law of 
any other State but is a subsisting valid marriage under the law for the time 
being in force within the jurisdiction of the Government and Parliament 
established by this Constitution shall be capable of contracting a valid ma-
rriage within that jurisdiction during the lifetime of the other party to the 
marriage so dissolved».
Article 42 provides:
«1. The State acknowledges that the primary and natural educator of the 
child is the Family and guarantees to respect the inalienable right and duty 
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of parents to provide, according to their means, for the religious and moral, 
intellectual, physical and social education of their children.
2. Parents shall be free to provide this education in their homes or in pri-
vate schools or in schools recognized or established by the State.
1º The State shall not oblige parents in violation of their conscience and 
lawful preference to send their children to schools established by the State, 
or to any particular type of school designated by the State.
2º The State shall, however, as guardian of the common good, require in 
view of actual conditions that the children receive a certain minimum edu-
cation, moral, intellectual and social.
4. The State shall provide for free primary education and shall endeavour 
to supplement and give reasonable aid to private and corporate educational 
initiative, and, when the public good requires it, provide other educational 
facilities or institutions with due regard, however, for the rights of parents, 
especially in the matter of religious and moral formation.
5. In exceptional cases, where the parents for physical or moral reasons 
fail in their duty towards their children, the State as guardian of the com-
mon good, by appropriate means shall endeavour to supply the place of 
the parents, but always with due regard for the natural and imprescriptible 
rights of the child».
Article 43 articulates a universalist natural law perception of the right 
to property. The complicating element is that property rights also crop up 
under Article 40.3.2, which provision is restricted to citizens. So far there 
has been no clear jurisprudence relating to the position of non-citizens in 
this context.
Article 44.2.10 guarantees «to every citizen» freedom of conscience and 
the free profession of religion, subject to public order and morality. The im-
plications for non-citizens have yet to be addressed but they surely raise sig-
nificant and obvious questions.
The jurisprudence on Articles 40 to 42
Let us turn to consider the jurisprudence on Articles 40 to 42. Three 
approaches emerge. The first, based on a literal interpretation, concludes that 
non-citizens do not have protection if the right in question is expressly guar-
anteed to citizens. The second, based on natural law theory, is willing to give 
protection to non-citizens, through some instances subject to the requirement 
of establishing some extra connection with the state. The third accepts that 
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protection may in some respects be afforded to non-citizens but it is separate 
from, and unequal to, that afforded to citizens24.
Speaking in broad terms, non-citizens have yet to establish a clear and 
unambiguous judicial recognition of entitlement to protection under Article 
40. So far as Articles 41 and 42 are concerned, they have had only limited pro-
tection, in spite of the fact that these Articles are not expressed to be limited 
to citizens.
Article 40
The most comprehensive analysis of the question whether non-citizens 
are entitled to protection under Article 40 is still the decision of The State 
(Nicolaou) v An Bord Uchtála25. There, a British citizen, the father of a child 
born outside marriage, challenged the validity of adoption legislation which 
did not require his being informed of the prospective adoption of the child. 
The arguments put forward by the father included the claim that the legisla-
tion violated Article 40.
In the High Court, differing views were expressed on the entitlement of 
the father to make this claim.
Henchy J quoted the text of Article 40: 1 and Article 4.3.1. He went on 
to state:
«It will be observed that these constitutional rights and guarantees are gi-
ven to citizens. But it is agreed that the prosecutor is not an Irish citizen; he 
is a British subject. Faced with this apparent impediment to the prosecutor’s 
claim to the benefit of rights and guarantees given only to citizens, his coun-
sel seeks to circumvent this seeming exclusion from the abmit of the cons-
titutional provisions I have quoted by relying on two submissions. First, he 
says that the word ‘citizen’ or ‘citizens’ in these provisions should be read as 
being equivalent to ‘person’ or ‘persons’, thereby including the prosecutor. 
Second, he says that the impugned provisions of the Adoption Act, 1952, are 
an unconstitutional violation of the rights and guarantees vested in citizens 
by these parts of Article 40, and that the prosecutor, although not a citizen, 
is entitled to rely on such unconstitutionality.
As for the first of these submissions, it is important to remember that 
Articles 40, 41, 42, 43 and 44 are headed, ‘Fundamental Rights’. Article 40 
24 Cf. Re Article 26 and ss 5 and 10 of the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Bill 1999 [2000] 2 IR 360.
25 [1966] IR 567.
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is sub-headed, ‘Personal Rights’, Article 41, ‘The Family’, Article 42, ‘Edu-
cation’, Article 43, ‘Private Property’, and Article 44, ‘Religion’. When one 
reads through these five Articles one sees that certain of the fundamental 
rights laid down are stated in terms of the citizen and others in terms which 
are not restricted by the test of citizenship. This is understandable, and, in 
some cases, necessary, when one considers the nature and scope of the rights 
protected by these Articles.
It is not, therefore, possible to say that the words ‘citizens’ or ‘citizen’ are 
equivalent to ‘persons’ or ‘person’ throughout these Articles. Indeed, I do 
not understand counsel for the prosecutor so to argue. In fact, he admits that 
it is not possible to equate ‘citizen’ with ‘person’ even throughout Article 40 
itself: for example, Article 40, 2, is in the following terms:
1º Titles of nobility shall not be conferred by the State.
2º No title of nobility or of honour may be accepted by any citizen except 
with the prior approval of the Government.
The bar on accepting titles of nobility or of honour except with the prior 
approval of the Government can of its very nature be applicable only to 
Irish citizens as defined by Article 9 of the Constitution. This was conceded 
by the prosecutor in the course of the argument. One further notices that 
Article 40, 4, 1º, says: ‘No citizen shall be deprived of his personal liberty 
save in accordance with law,’ while Article 40, 4, 2º, 3º, 4º, and 5º, which 
deal with habeas corpus, refer to the unlawful detention of ‘a person’. The 
prosecutor’s argument is therefore reduced to saving that while the words 
‘citizens’ and ‘citizen’ in other parts of Article 40 may have the meaning gi-
ven to them by Article 9, they should be read as being identical with ‘person’ 
and ‘persons’ in Article 40, 1 and 3. I find nothing to support this argument.
Article 5 of the Constitution says that Ireland is a sovereign, independent, 
democratic state. Article 40, 1, states the equalitarian standing of its citizens 
by saving that as human beings they shall be held before the law. Article 40, 
2, seeks to provide that there shall be no obtrusion on this equality of citi-
zenship by the conferring of titles of nobility by the State, or by any citizen 
accepting a title of nobility or of honour except with the prior approval of 
the Government. In my view, the citizens referred to in article 40, 1, are the 
same as those in Article 40, 2, namely citizens as defined by article 9.
Article 9, 2 says: ‘Fidelity to the nation and loyalty to the State are funda-
mental political duties of all citizens’. In so far as personal rights are concer-
ned, the State is concerned primarily only with its citizens, who owe it this 
loyalty. The preamble to the Constitution, by the words, ‘we, people of Eire... 
Do hereby adopt, enact, and give to ourselves this Constitution’, shows that 
this is basically a constitution of the Irish people for the Irish people.
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The purpose of Article 40, 3, of the Constitution –and of other provi-
sions with which I need not concern myself– is to state a constitutional right 
which attaches to citizenship and falls as a duty on the State. It is only a 
citizen who can claim that right, and he is entitled to it as a constitutional in-
cident of his citizenship. The prosecutor, being an alien, has no claim to it».
Teevan J came to a somewhat different conclusion. He stated:
«The question... arose whether a non-citizen could be heard to invoke the 
fundamental rights provision of the Constitution (other than, of course, Arti-
cle 40, 4, 2 which does not arise in this case), particularly against a statute. The 
Attorney General did not take the point and his counsel stated that, in the 
present case, I would be prepared to proceed without reference to the matter 
of non-citizenship when it has been allowed to pass by the Attorney General.
The Constitution enjoins legal recognition of the fundamental rights it 
defines and acknowledges. Those rights do not owe their existence to the 
Constitution. While the Constitution, governing the rights and duties of 
citizen to citizen, citizen to State and State to citizen, can guarantee the 
preservation, maintenance and enforcement of those rights and duties only 
to citizens, I do not think it follows that we are obliged to deny the cons-
titutional protection of those natural rights enshrined in the Constitution 
to every non-citizen merely on the ground of his non-citizenship, even to 
a person who not only lack citizenship but is also not resident here (for we 
have resident non-citizens to whom the point would be of more practical 
importance).
There must, of course, be many cases wherein the non-citizen must sub-
mit to a position of un-equality with the citizen, where the law will deny to 
the non-citizen privileges and legal remedies enjoyed by the citizen. Whe-
re, however, there is no conflict between the common good and the right 
sought to be asserted by a non-citizen, I do not think the Court should feel 
obliged willy-nilly to refuse to hear the non-citizen’s plaint; that is to say 
where, if his case be well founded otherwise, his own personal rights are 
involved...
In my view it is one for discernment according to the particular circum-
stance. Circumstances may exist by reason of which it would be no more 
than impertinent for a non-citizen to attack the constitutionality of one of 
our statutes, or by reason of which it would otherwise be necessary or pru-
dent to take the point. In the present case the Attorney General did not 
consider it necessary, or politic, to do so and with respect to the opposite 
opinion I think this should be accepted and that the issues might be deter-
mined without reference to the prosecutor’s non-citizenship...
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It does not directly arise and it is unnecessary for me to state my own opi-
nion but I think I should say that while I agree with the opinion... [of] Mr. 
Justice Henchy that the constitutional guarantees extend only to citizens, I res-
pectfully disagree with his interpretation of sub-article 2 of Article 40 and with 
the reasoning he derives there from. Sub-article 1 of Article 40, in my opinion, 
is complete in itself and does not require the aid of sub-article 2. Of its own 
force it ensures that the law will be administered without respect of titles».
Teevan J’s analysis fell well short of the conclusion that citizenship is 
irrelevant to the scope of the constitutional protection. Its thrust rather is to 
deny the absolute proposition that non-citizenship is invariably fatal to a claim 
for such protection afforded by Article 40. It is surely significant also that 
Teevan J conceded that there must be «many cases wherein the non-citizen 
must submit to a position of un-equality with the citizen, where the law will 
deny to the non-citizen privileges and legal remedies enjoyed by the citizen». 
Teevan J made no attempt to define what these cases might be or how much 
latitude the Oireachtas might have in denying rights to non-citizens.
Murnaghan J adopted a neutral stance but one that was clearly unsympa-
thetic to the proposition that citizenship was not relevant to the scope of the 
constitutional protection.
On appeal, the Supreme Court did not attempt to resolve the question. 
Walsh J (delivering the judgment of the Court) stated:
«The High Court judgments rested in part upon the fact that the appe-
llant is not a citizen of Ireland. This Court expressly reserves for another and 
more appropriate case consideration of the effect of non-citizenship upon the 
interpretation of the Articles in question and also the right of a non-citizen to 
challenge the validity of an Act of the Oireachtas having regard to the provi-
sions of the Constitution. The opinion which the Court has pronounced upon 
these Articles is not dependent upon or affected by the fact that the appellant 
is not a citizen of Ireland or by the fact that the Attorney General through his 
counsel informed this Court that he did not wish to submit in this case that 
the rights, if any, of the appellant under the Articles in question were any the 
less by reason of the fact that he was not a citizen of Ireland».
No subsequent decision has involved such a close analysis of the position 
of the non-citizens regarding Article 4026. The only other decision in which a 
26 Though Hamilton P, in Kennedy v Ireland [1987J IR 587, for reasons unelaborated upon, accepted 
that a non-citizen (the second plaintiff) was entitled to invoke Article 40.3. In view of the stance of 
the defendant regarding the second plaintiff’s claim, this is scarcely a hugely significant precedent.
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serious attempt was made to do so was Finn v Attorney General27, where Bar-
rington J, obiter, adopted a natural law perspective in concluding that:
«[t]he fact that the wording of Article 40.3 commits the State to protect 
and vindicate the life of ‘every citizen’ does not justify the inference that it 
relieves the State of the obligation to defend and vindicate the lives of per-
sons who are not citizens».
Two comments on this passage seem appropriate. First, it does not 
amount to the claim that the rights of non-citizens under Article 40.3 are 
co-existensive with those of citizens. Secondly, so far as it is based on natural 
law theory, one cannot ignore the crass rejection of that theory by the Su-
preme Court in the Abortion Information Article 26 Reference28. It is true 
that natural law theory has since then been rehabilitated somewhat but the 
process of resuscitation would need to continue for some time and at greater 
intensity before one could have any confidence in contending that non-citi-
zens have any, let alone, co-extensive protection under Article 40.3.
Articles 41 and 42
Articles 41 and 42 give effect to a philosophy that regards the family 
based on a marriage as a crucial focus of normative autonomy, over whose 
values the state’s values should have priority in only limited, defined cir-
cumstances of parental failure to duty for physical or moral reasons. This 
model of the family-state relationship clearly has implications in relation 
to state interventions in the areas of guardianship, child care and adoption. 
The danger, of course, is that too great an emphasis on family autonomy 
would force state agencies to hold back from protecting children from the 
risk of injury, abuse or neglect by their parents. Family autonomy translated 
largely into parental autonomy since children were considered to lack the 
capacity to exercise autonomy.
Let us turn briefly to consider the position relating to adoption. When 
adoption was introduced in 1952, it was designed principally to deal with cases 
where the mother of a child born outside marriage sought to have the child 
27 [1983] IR 154.
28 In re Article 26 and the Regulation of Information (Services outside the State for the Termination of 
Pregnancies) Bill 1995 [1995] 1 IR 1.
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adopted. The legislation did not provide for the adoption of children des-
ignated «legitimate», whose parents were married to each other at the time 
of their child’s birth. The general legal opinion was that the adoption of this 
category of children would not be consistent with the terms of Article 41 and 
42 of the Constitution.
It was only in the relatively recent past that this opinion came to be ques-
tioned. The Adoption Bill of 1987 provided for the adoption of children –re-
gardless of the status of their parents– where the parents «for physical or moral 
reasons have failed in their duty towards the child», the failure is likely to con-
tinue until the child is eighteen, and «constitutes an abandonment on the part 
of the parents of all parental rights, whether under the Constitution or other-
wise, with respect of the child».
On an Article 26 Reference29 by the President, the Supreme Court up-
held the validity of the Bill.
The international remit of Articles 41 and 42
It seems clear enough that the values underlying Articles 41 and 42 are 
universalist in that they reflect unambiguously a natural law philosophy relat-
ing to marriage, the family and the relationship between the family and the 
state.
Does this mean that Article 41 and 42 should be interpreted as protecting 
all families throughout the world? Not necessarily. It does not follow from the 
fact that these Articles reflect a universalist philosophy that they radiate to 
all corners of the earth. There would be nothing logically inconsistent about 
their being subject to specific restrictions such as citizenship or residence in 
Ireland, for example.
The language of the Articles gives only opaque clues as to such possible 
limitations. The character of the references to the State, notably the pledge 
by the State to guard with special care the institution of marriage30 and the 
State’s undertakings to provide for primary education31 and to endeavour to 
supply the place of the parents, in exceptional cases of parental failure of duty 
29 Re the Adoption (No 2) Bill 1987 [1989] IR656, analysed by Byrne & Binchy, Annual Review of Irish
Law 1988.
30 Article 41.1.2º.
31 Article 42.4.
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towards their children32, are hard to reconcile with the idea that Articles 41 
and 42 were intended to embrace every family in the world.
Northampton County Council v ABF and MBF33 was the first of several 
decisions involving resort to the Irish courts by English parents seeking the 
protection of Articles 41 and 42 against threatened action by a local authority 
in relation to their children –such as adoption– which would not be permissi-
ble under Articles 41 and 42. A 14-year-old child had been placed in the care 
of the plaintiff council by a court order but (it claimed) illegally removed by 
her father to Ireland. It was «quite clear»34 that, if the child was returned to 
England, it was proposed that she should be legally adopted, contrary to the 
wishes of the father, through her mother appeared to approve. The father 
and mother were both English citizens and domiciliaries. Their marriage had 
been celebrated in England and their child had been born there.
Hamilton J refused the plaintiff’s application for an order returning the 
child to it. He quoted Article 41.1 of the Constitution and two passages from 
Walsh J’s judgment in McGee v Attorney General35. In the first passage, Walsh 
had said:
«Articles 40, 41, 42 and 44 of the Constitution all fall within that section 
of the Constitution which is called ‘Fundamental Rights’. Articles 41, 42 
and 43 emphatically, reject the theory that there are no rights without law, 
no rights contrary to law and no rights anterior to law. They indicate that 
justice is placed above the law and acknowledge that natural rights, or hu-
man rights, are not created by law but that the Constitution confirms their 
existence and gives them protection. The individual has natural and human 
rights over which the State has no authority: and the Family as the natural 
primary and fundamental group of society has rights as such which the State 
cannot control»36.
In the second passage, Walsh, J. said:
«The natural or human rights to which I have referred earlier in this jud-
gment are part of what is generally called the natural law».
32 Article 43.5.
33 [1982] ILRM 164 (High Ct, Hamilton J, 1981).
34 [1982] ILRM at 164.
35 [1974] IR 284.
36 [1974] IR, at 310.
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Hamilton, J. stated:
«In the course of his judgment in G v. An Bord Uchtála37 [Walsh J.] stated 
that he still held these views, with which I am in complete agreement.
The Supreme Court in The State (Nicolaou) v. An Bord Uchtála38 expressly 
reserved for another and more appropriate case consideration of the effect 
of non-citizenship upon the interpretation of the Articles in question.
It seems to me however that non-citizenship can have no effect on the in-
terpretation of Article 41 or the entitlement to the protection afforded by it.
What Article 41 does is to recognise the Family as the natural primary 
and fundamental unit group of society and as a moral institution possessing 
inalienable and imprescriptible rights antecedent and superior to all positive 
law, which rights the State cannot control. In the words of Walsh, J. already 
quoted, ‘these rights are part of what is generally called the natural law’ and 
as such are antecedent and superior to all positive law.
The natural law is of universal application and applies to all human per-
sons, be they citizens of this State or not, and in my opinion it would be 
inconceivable that the father of the infant child would not be entitled to rely 
on the recognition of the Family contained in Article 41 for the purpose of 
enforcing his rights as the lawful father of the infant the subject matter of 
the proceeding herein or that he should lose such entitlement merely be-
cause he removed the child to this jurisdiction for the purpose of enforcing 
his said rights.
These rights are recognised by Bunreacht na h-Éireann and the courts 
created under it as antecedent and superior to all positive law: they are not 
so recognised by the law or the courts of the jurisdiction to which it is sought 
to have the infant returned.
Consequently it is for these reasons that I have at this stage refused to 
grant the orders sought by the applicant herein viz. that the child be re-
turned to them or their agent.
The child however also has natural rights. As stated by the Chief Justice 
in G v. An Bord Uchtála39 ‘having been born, the child has the right to be fed 
and to live, to be reared and educated, to have the opportunity of working 
and of realising his or her full personality and dignity as a human being. 
These rights of the child (and others which I have not enumerated) must 
37 [1980] IR 32 (Sup. Ct., 1978).
38 [1966] IR 567.
39 [1980] IR, at 56.
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equally be protected and vindicated by the State’. It will be necessary the-
refore to have a full plenary hearing of this application for the purpose of 
ascertaining whether the child’s rights are being protected before any final 
order can be made in this case»40.
Hamilton, J.’s judgment can perhaps be interpreted as involving merely 
the denial of the unqualified position that Article 41.1 of the Constitution may 
not be availed of by a non-citizen who has brought a child to this jurisdiction 
in defiance of a court order in a foreign jurisdiction. This falls well short of the 
positive assertion that foreigners, wherever they reside or are domiciled, and 
regardless of the absence of any connection with Ireland, may avail themselves 
of the protection of Article 41.1. What Northampton County Council v. A.B.F. 
and M.B.F. leaves entirely unresolved is the nature of the connection which 
will be sufficient to enable a non-citizen to invoke Article 41. 1. The decision, 
therefore, simply does not address the broad issue that, on a casual reading, it 
may seem to determine.
Some later decisions took a far more cautious approach
It seemed for many years that the Northamptonshire decision had not 
found support in Irish jurisprudence. Relatively recently however, in London
Borough of Sutton v RM41, in the context of the Hague Convention on Inter-
national Child Abduction, it was accepted on behalf of the applicant that the 
English family that had come to Ireland was entitled to invoke Articles 41 and 
42 of the Constitution.
It might have been the case that the father and children were Irish citi-
zens but, even if this was not so, Finlay Geoghegan J accepted that the chil-
dren and mother were living in Ireland at the time of the hearing and were 
entitled to these rights.
Observations on Jurisprudence of Articles 40 to 42
This cursory analysis of the case law establishes, I believe, that the courts 
have just about reached first base in their analysis of the remit of constitu-
tional protection under Articles 40 to 42. The judges have adopted compet-
40 [1982] ILRM at 165-166.
41 High Court, 19 December 2002, analysed by BYRNE & BINCHY, Annual Review of Irish Law
2002, 68-71.
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ing approaches, some literal, others philosophical, but no judgment could be 
described as preventing a thorough and comprehensive framework of analysis 
that brings together all the precedents and seeks to render them coherent.
The Administration of Justice
There is one aspect of constitutional protection where it seems clear be-
yond argument that non-citizenship does not reduce one’s rights. This is in 
relation to the administration of justice. In The State (McFadden) v Governor 
of Mountjoy Prison42, Barrington J held that a British national resisting extra-
dition was entitled to invoke the guarantee to the citizen of basic fairness of 
procedure contained in Article 40.3. He referred to In re Haughey43, in which 
Ó Dálaigh CJ had stated:
«The provisions of Article 38.1 of the Constitution apply only to Trials 
of criminal charges in accordance with Article 38; but in proceedings before 
any tribunal where a party to the proceedings is on risk of having his good 
name or his person or property, or any of his personal rights jeopardized, 
the proceedings may be correctly classes as proceedings which may affect 
his rights, and in compliance with the Constitution, the State, either by its 
enactment or through the courts, must outlaw any procedures which will 
restrict or prevent the party concerned from vindicating these rights»44.
Barrington J observed:
«The prosecutor is not an Irish citizen, but [counsel] for the respondent45
has taken no point on this. It appears to me that he was right not to do so. 
The substantive rights and liabilities of an alien may be different to those 
of a citizen. The alien, for instance, may not have the right to vote or may 
be liable to deportation. But when the Constitution prescribes basic fairness 
of procedures in the administration of the law it does so, not only because 
citizens have rights, but also because the courts in the administration of 
justice are expected to observe certain forms of due process enshrined in the 
Constitution. Once the courts have seising of a dispute, it is difficult to see 
how the standards they should apply in investigating it should, in fairness, 
be any different in the case of an alien than those in the case of a citizen».
42 [1981] ILRM 113 (High Ct, Barrington J, 1980).
43 [1971] IR 217 (Supreme Ct).
44 [1971] IR, at 264.
45 [1981] ILRM, at 117.
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Professor Casey notes that:
«[T]his reasoning would avoid several difficulties. If ‘citizen’ in Article 
40 cannot be treated as equivalent to ‘person’, certain curious results would 
seem to follow. Evidence obtained in breach of constitutional rights, inad-
missible in criminal proceedings against a citizen, might be he Id admissible 
against an alien. An example would be statements obtained during the cour-
se of detention which, in the case of a citizen, would violate Article 40.4.10; 
or real evidence obtained by a search which would, in case of a citizen, vio-
late the guarantee of Article 40.5. Any such developments, however logical, 
would leave the State in breach of its obligations under the European Con-
vention on Human Rights, which protects ‘persons’. But since Article 38.1 
guarantees that ‘no person’ shall be tried on any criminal charge ‘save in due 
course of law’ the way is open to avoid any such result by reading ‘due course 
of law’ in the light of those obligation»46.
In The State (Trimbole) v Governor of Mountjoy Prison47, where an Australi-
an citizen had been arrested under section 30 of the Offences Against the State 
Act 1939 as a delaying devise to facilitate the processing of an application for 
his extradition, Egan J invoke McFadden, stating:
«It need hardly be emphasized that in considering the legality of the de-
tention of the prosecutor his guilt or innocence in respect of the charges 
against him is totally irrelevant. The offences for which he is wanted in 
Australia could hardly be more serious but the same legal principles would 
be applicable to an Irish citizen who was wanted in Australia for an offence 
of simple larceny. The fact that he may be a citizen of Australia does not 
deprive the prosecutor of his right to basic fairness of procedures...»48.
On appeal to the Supreme Court, McCarthy J observed:
«If... the Executive itself abuses the process of law as in this case by the 
wrongful use of s. 30 of the Offences Against the State Act, 1939, and, for 
what it is worth, persists in that abuse by giving false evidence in the course 
of the constitutional enquiry, are the courts to turn aside and, apart from 
46 CASEY, J., Constitutional Law in Ireland (3rd ed., 2000), 447.
47 [1985] IR 550 (Supreme Ct, affirming High Ct., Egan J).
48 Id., at 565.
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administering severe strictures to those concerned, appear to sanction the 
procedure that has been adopted to secure the extradition of an individual 
to the requesting State? It is not easy for anyone, particularly those outside 
the courts, to disassociate legal principles from the facts of any given case; 
it is important, therefore, to emphasise that the application of such legal 
principles must be the same for an Australian citizen on a temporary visit to 
Ireland as they would be for an Irish citizen, permanently resident in Ire-
land, when either of them is sought by a requesting State with which State 
Ireland has an extradition treaty or arrangement»49.
It is scarcely surprising or controversial that the courts should be so-
licitous to ensure that the administration of justice is applied even-handedly 
as between citizens and non-citizens. Article 38.1 contains no limitation re-
garding citizenship: it provides simply that: «[n]o person shall be tried on any 
criminal charge rule in due course of law»50.
As the passage quoted above from Professor Casey’s textbook shows, it 
would be difficult if the guarantee contained in Article 38.1 were qualified by 
violations of due course of law which are capable of being classed as falling 
under other constitutional provisions which are expressed to apply to citizens. 
The courts have a distinct sense of proprietorship of the administration to 
justice51.
49 Id, at 581-582. See also Re Article 26 and ss 5 and 10 of the lIIegal lmmigrants (Trafficking) Bill
1999 [2000] 2 IR 360, D. P. v Governor of the Training Unit, Glengariff Parade [2001] I IR 492 
(High Ct, Finnegan J), Murphy v Greene [1990] 2 IR 566, al 578 (Supreme Cl, perGriffin J).
50 Emphasis added. For consideration of Article 6.5 see KELLY, J.M., The Irish Constitution (4th ed., 
2003), chapter 6.5.
51 See also Rederij Kennemerland BV v Attomey General [1989] ILRM 821 (Supreme Ct, 1988, aff’g 
High Ct, Gannon J, 1987). This decision contains the following broad statement by Gannon J 
(at 840):
«The vessels involved in these proceedings are Dutch owned and operated, and the masters are 
Dutch nationals and I infer, are neither citizens of Ireland nor have property nor place of busi-
ness nor residence in Ireland. By entering and making use of the waters within the fishery limits 
of the State they become amenable to the laws of this country. Thereupon they are entitled 
to expect and to insist that those laws will be applied and administered in accordance with the 
Constitution of the State. To the extent that the laws are no so applied o administered in relation 
to them, their persons and property they are entitled to call upon the Superior Courts to uphold 
the Constitution and to provide a remedy against breach of the provisions of the Constitution. 
But I do not think they have any right or standing in this Court to challenge the legislation 
of this country enacted or adopted by the legislature beyond or for any purpose other than of 
affording to them a remedy or relief for a wrong, harm or disadvantage suffered by such alleged 
failure to uphold the Constitution».
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CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
This brief review of international developments shows how difficult and 
unresolved are the questions concerning the rights of non-citizens. We can 
hope for further clarification in future years.
KELLY, cit., para. 7.1.44 comments in respect of this passage from Gannon J’s judgment that:
«[t]he significance of this approach is that it allows for the application of the fundamental rights 
provisions of the Constitution to non-citizens without having to invoke any natural law theory».
It would be wrong to regard this dictum as representing a major jurisprudential contribution 
to the debate on the remit of constitutional protection of non-citizens. Gannon J came to no 
conclusion that any law was unconstitutional. On appeal the Supreme Court had nothing to say 
on Gannon J’s obiter observation. If the intended import of his remarks was that mere entry into 
the jurisdiction of the State automatically confers as extensive constitutional protection on for-
eigners as on citizens, this proposition has no legal precedent and, whatever its possible merits, 
would need some further elaboration.
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